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In the Suprente Court of the
State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
.AJppellant,

vs.
MARION H. CHRISTENSEN and
RINTHA G. CHRISTENSEN, his

CASE
NO. 9544

1

wife,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS

1be responderirts in this case, Marion and Rinrtha Christensen., are elderly people ·who have been in the farmmg
and sheep-m.ising business at their property in American
Fork, Utah, since before 1930. 'Uhey have specializ~ ·in
maintairu.ng 400 -450 head o.f sheep for the last ten y~
on their set-up consisting of over. 27 acres of hay_, ~'
corn and pasture on their faml, together wilth 1~34 acres
oonta.ining a ·home, granary, four sheds and pasture located ·in the south part of American Fbrk CiJty, three~ of a mile north of the fann acreage. The year..

1
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2
round sheep operation was operated solely by respondents
and they utilized fue protective. ·lambing sheds (ronverted
chicken ·coops) with pasture on their home property to earlylamb 150-175 ewes at a time. in Mareh and April of each
year to obtain favorable marketing conditions. They also
used rthe sheds and pasture with availaJble electricity Wld
water to shear and dock the sheep in the spring. . After
the herd was taken to range in June, the ten valuable rams
of respondents were kept on the home pasture the ·balance
of the year. Respondents could ·conveniently trail the sheep
back and forth the three-fourths mile between the farm
and the home ··set:-up by using a rear entrance and gate
which they had used for over twenty-five years (Tr. 16-28,
47-52, 69, 152-156, 197).
Responden~ts used their truck to put feed in the mangers for the sheep they were caring for in the pasture at
the home property. Without the pasture to feed and graze
the 175 head.of.Jambing ewes·and·to,shear the sheep, they
could nat use the sheds on tJhe property. The State of Utah
condemned practically all of the pasture, leaving oniy the
buildings, and made it impossible to accommodate any large
number of sheep for tending and care on the home property and the condemnation cut off the access trail. to the
south, makmg it unfeasible to drive the sheep around the
underpasses to travel between the farm and the home property. Ua.ck O!f feed and room made it impossible to pasture tJhe ten buck ~ams at all. No other pasture grounds
north of the .fireeway were avail,able rto respondents for utilizing fueir sheds and facilities on their home loca:tion
1

1

<Tr·

20, 28, 43, 48, 156-160).
On damag~, .fuere was a wide variance ~garding. severance between the ·witnesses for the owners (responde.nJb;)
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and witnesses for the State. The ~vidence in behalf of respondents showed that usefulness and value of the ·sheds
and buildings remaining (not movable nor sa.lvagable) had
been destroyed by the taking of the pasture ground and
the proximity of the highway had damaged the house with
the attendant factors o[ traffic noise, dust, dirt, headlights,
etc. The grade of the road was five feet higher than the
ground surlace in back of respondents' house and the road
ascended 25 feet higher two blocks east rand west Otf said
house to go over the underpasses (Tr. 9-11, 73-83, 90-94,
121-126). The witneSses for the State both testified there
wa:s no damage to the remaining land and buildings except for trivial amounts of $420.00 (Harding) for leaving
the property unsquare (Tr. 180) or of $620.00 (Stein) for
reducing the size of the building lort (Tr. 219).
A swnmary of the evidence of respondents and .their
expert witnesses on values and damages entitled to compensation from rthe State of Utah, :Collows, to-wit:
Marion and Rintha Chrisfunsen (Tr. 39-40, 164) :
(1)

.54 acre taken. . . . . . . . . . . .

(2)

Damages to ·home, sheds,

(3)

$1,350.00

buildings and remainder land

$6,932.00

Total damage . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$8,282.00

Denzil A. Brown (Tr. 57-58):
(1)

.54 acre 1Rken..... . . . . . . .

(2)

Damages to ·home, ; sheds,
buildings and remainder ~and $5,694.48

(3)

Total damage . . . . .. . . . . . . . .

$1,080.00 ·

$6,774.48
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Milton Harrison (Tr. 90-91) :
''
.
( 1) · · .'54 .acre
taken
. . .. . .' . . . . . .; ..

$1,080.00

Damages to home, sl)eds,
:builduigs and renuldri<Ier'Iand

$5,940.00

Total damage . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$7,020.00

.

(2)

(3)

.

Afton Payne (Tr. 121, 125-126):
(1)

.54 acre taken . . . . . . . . . . . .

$1,080.00

(2)

Damages to home, sheds,
buildings and remainder land

$5,698.50

Total damage . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$6,778.50

(3)

The jury viewed the premises (Tr. 15) before the ta.k·in.g of evidence from the witnesses, but no complaint was
made by . appellant of any irregularities with the jury at
the view until aft~ the verdict was rendered and appellant
filed a motion for a new trial (R. 78) . The affidavit (filed
after trial) of the Federal road employee, Faxon (R. 83-84)
shows on its face that Attorney Aldrich for the State of
Utah was present and participated prior to the trial at the
jury view
the conversations alleged to have been improper. A coqnter-affidavit by said respondent Rintha
Ohristeriseri (R. 24-26), among other things, categorically
denies' she ever addressed the jury at large and denies the
Affidavit of said Glen S. Faxon, Jr. The Court after the
view (Tr. 16) a.dmonished the jury: "You are instructed
again that anything you,may have heard anyone say relative t:o the
property;· eith~ by attorneys .or :the-'Ba:iliff or
.
~anyon~· ·e,lse, you are not ·to consider as evidence in the
case.,,.-:.· The trlal tnen ·prbeeeded."

in
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I
The zoning question regarding respondents' property
Presents no problem because all of the wi1nesses testified
it was zoned agricultuml - residential art the time of condemnation and that ·this allowed the continuing usage for
sheep operations as conducted by respondents in the past
and rthat this was the highest and ·best use of rthe property
(~. 45-46, 73, 83, 95-96, 110, 132-138, 153, 1 ~~-174,. 219,
231) .. ~on Oh.ristensen testified he could not raise poult~ there no~ (at time of trial) becaJUse he hw;ln'rt raised
them there for past two years and 1hrus were zoned out
(Tr. 27). The 'State was -not. prevented from presenting
.

~der:t~

.

of ~g as both Olf._the State's witnesses, Harding
and Stein, did testify that the property could be..~ f<?r
poultry raising at date of condem.nation (Tr. 177, 219-220).
The State, by counsel, .said ·they wanted rijle knowledge of
their witness and ·not the ·American· Fork ordinances as
evidenre, ·though Harding admitted on voir dire he had ·the
ordinances and would. produce $em.. · 'Tihe State failed to
produce the ordinances and yet· had their witness explain
the zoning regulation ('IT. 174-175) .
J

•

The State even had responden/ts' witness, Denzil Brown,
testify on ~examination .that.. the sheep ·usage of rthe
property ·had become non-conrfomrlng (though permitted)
by asking whether if this use were ever discontinued for
a period of time, could it thereaf.ter be used for sheep production (Tr. 73) ..·

The Court, in its Instlru.ction No. 7 to the jury (Tr.
272, R. 61), indicated that damage to the remaming land
and the use to whiCh said remainder was being~ put_ ~ reWdents
elements t0 be considered m fixing the ~..
~; if auy. -'Ibis instruction was not considered injurious

were
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by appellant as it was not Urg~ as error in its- Motion for
Remittitur, and/<»:- Motion for New Trial (R. ~76--19) nor
in the Notice of Appeal setting forth the "matters and points
of error" (R. 87~88).
'I'he trial judge considered the arguments and written
briefs filed by the parties in the matter of the appellant's
Mortion for R·emission of Verdict by Remittitur, and in the
Alternative, a Motion for New Trial, and duly refused any
remission· of the·amount of the verdict, denied said Motions
and upheld the jury verdict assessing the defendants' compensation and damages, which verdict was based on the
great weight of evidence ~and within the issues ·of the case
as follows:
(1)

Fair market value of .54 acre
of land as of January 18,

1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- (2)

(3)

$1,080.00

Damages ·~ to the defendanrts' remaining property
not taken by reason of its

severance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$4,-420.00

TOTAL VERDICT

$5,500.00

(R. 72-73, 75, 82, 85-86)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE VIEW BY THE JURY OF -THE C!ONDEMNED
PREMISES DID NOT PREVENT THE STATE OF UTAH
FROM OBTAINING' A FAIR. AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
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POINT II
THE STATE 0'F UTAH WAS NOT· DENIED. A FAIR

AND_ IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY QUESTIONS ASKED ON
CROSS EXAlVIINATION O·F STATE'S WITNESS WIL·
BUR HARDING.
POINT ill
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO RECEIVE EVIDE.NCE ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, APPELLANT, RELATING TO ZO·NING RBSTRICTIO'NS ON THE SUBJECT PRO,PERTY.

POINT IV
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 7 OF THE FO~URTH DISTRICT CO·URT WAS NOT AN INC0RRECT ·sTATElVIENT OF THE LAW AND DID NOT. CO•NSTITUTE
PREJUDI·CIAL ERRO'R.
1

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE VIEW BY THE JURY OF THE CONDEMNED
PREMISES DID NOT PREVENT THE STATE OF UTAH
FROM OBTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
The State of Urtah requested the view m the ~premises
by the jury before the chief evidence .Jhad been presented
in fue case (Tr. 13-15). After the view the ·court admonished the jury at the beginning of the presentation of the
eviden~

(Tr..

16) as follows:

·..

''You are instructed· again that anyt~g ·you m~y
have heard anyone say relative to rthe property, eithe~
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I
by ·attorneys ·ar the Bailiff or ·anyooe else, you are ~oi
to consider as evidence in the c8se.''

The State Of. Utah made no recoJ;d at any time __dur::ing the progress of the trial of ariy. uTegularirties allegedly
occurring at the jury viewing of the premises, but did compl.ain after the jury verdict was received through an affidavit (R. 83-84) by a Federal Bureau of Roads employee,
Glen E. Faxon, setting forth alleged irregularities of which
Attorney Aldrich for the State of Utah 'had full knowledge
art the said jury viewing of ·1Jhe premises. No motion to
impanel a new jury or declare a mistrial was ever made
by anyone in this case.
If nothing else occurred, the State should be deemro
to have waived its right to a mistrial, if any, by not taking timely objection to alleged irregularities or not moving for a new jury or for a mistrial.
However, the said affidavit by Faxon, alleging misconduct was controverted and denied by an affidavit of
respondent, Rintha Christensen (R. 24-26), which also sets
forth certain irregular conduct of appellant's Attorney
Aldrich in personally pointing out to the jury and showing
the jury the premises before respondents appeared on the
premises with their attorneys. If the ~parties proceeded
to trial and knowingly submit the case to the jury after
such view, they both should be bound by the jury verd~ct
and could .not be heard t9 complain thereafter, especially
aft~ the wa.rnmg and instruction by the court _to the jury
t~ . :disregard anything . they _heard anyone. 8?:~ .relative to
''>:n·,:. ..:·."

,·

tlie . Property

.

•... ·

. , . . ...

..

..

.

at the yt:e:w. , .·
., ._ .• '· .
.. ;,
... '.
.. '
.
·- . ' '..
..
... '
·
Respondents deny any prejudicial ~u~l but see
annotation 45 ALR 2nd 1124, 1130, setting 'forth
that
l..·-~·

.~·

cases
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p~JudiciaJ misconduct at a. jtuy view may be waived by

failure of tJhe losing side to make a timely objection; or
that misconduct may be corTected · by an instruction from
the Court to disregard anything the jury may have learned

as a result of such misconduct:; or that misconduct by both
sides offsets each other.
The discretion of the trial judge (who knew all 11he
conditions of the jury view) in not granting the State of
U·~ any relief upon the basis of such alleged irregularities should be upheld. The question was argued and briefed
for the lower Court by the parties prior to the denial of
the appellant's Motion for a New Trial after the verdict had
been entered (R. 76-86). In addition, the substantive matters alleged by said Faxon to 'have been said by Rinrtha
Ohl"istensen were not prejudicial. Aptlellanrt eompladns only_
that it was prejudiced by the presence of said respondent
and that she had to be cautioned hy State's attorney. 'f.hls,
the appellant never complained aJbout. nntil after the trial,
wl)ile knowing all the facts dwing the progress of rthe trial.
Appellant didn't even cross-examine Mrs. Christensen on
'her testimony which set out all the facts allegedly started
by ,her improperly at the view (R. 165).

There was no issue ·whatever in the case respecting
loss of profits as mentioned on P. 12 of appellant's brief.
Rather, respondents contended (and fue jury agreed) thart
the evidence showed the usefulness and value of the sheds
and buildings for accommodating iarge nwnbers of sheep
·had been destroyed by appropriating virtually· a11· of· the
pasture and leaving only the buildings (Tr. 20-21, 124-125~
and States' Emilbit No. 1)·.
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Hayward v.· Richardsoh·

347 ·P.· 2nd 475, holds that

C~ctioo Co.. <Mont.l959)
a losirig party must ~btain ~~

adveme ruling from the court regaTdmg IDJ.proper matter
going before the jury, before ·he Is in a position to contend
On appeal that trial court oommitted error; and also that
where there has been misconduct in the trial without an
opportunity to object in advance, the aggrieved party may
move the court for a mistrial or venire de novo, Hnd failing .in that, he will he deemed to ~have taken his chances
with the jury.
POINT ll

THE STATE OF UTAH WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR
AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY QUESTIONS ASKED ON
CROSS EXAMINATIO·N OF STATE'S WITNESS WILBUR HARDING.
At the outset, it should be lUlderstood that the questions complained of (not the answers) were asked of ap-

pellant's expert witness, Wilbur Harding, upon cross-examination by counsel for respondents. Also, be it remembered that Mr. Harding was not an ordinary witness, but
an expert hired and paid by appellant to make appraisals
and be a professional wi1ness for the State of Utah Highway Department as a part of his busin.ess..
The case of State v. Peek, 1 U. 2nd 263, 265 P. 2nd
630, holds 1that ''as .long as cross-examination tends to <1&.
close the truth, it should never be curtailed or. limited."
In. an eXtensive opinion in the Peek case, this court justifies .the .wi<;Ie. latitude allowed for cross-examination,,~·
pecl··ally of ·value wi~tnesses and opini,Qn witnesses. t~ sh~·.
their familiarity or lack of familiarity with the ...value ·of
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sim~ar .property.

The opinion notes that value on similar
prope~ may be inquire<I .into on cross-examjnation even
in jurisdictions which exclude such evidence on direct examination. Such cross-examination may include the details of such sales and the items used by the witness in
arriving at his valuation. Quoting from 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 183, Sec. 18.45 (2), the opinion states the
following:
"The scope of th·e cross-examination of experts
and other witnesses who have testified to value in land
damage cases is very broad, since cross-examination
is often the only p:rortecti.on of the opposing party
against the unwarranted estimates that a certain class
of mercenary experts is wont to indulge in . .. . . . .
A witness who has . given an opinion of value may,
however, in the discretion of the eourt, be asked questions on ·cross-examination, for the purpose of testing
his opinion, which would he improper upon <:Iirect examination . . . . .
''The opinion of a witness may be impeached by
showing that his acts are inconsistent witll his words,
as for example by showing that ~he has offered tile
same or similar property for sale at a price far different from what he now says it is worth, or he may
be asked whether ~he has not made inconsistent statements upon the same point upon other occasions.''
In the cross-examination of the ''e~'' WUbur Harding that appellant complains of (Tr. 200-201) irt was
brought out that said Harding had in fact appraised the
adjacent similar ·property for the State m Utah, but-~
spondents were not allowed to inquire upon cross--examination. what, if anything, the expert had previously ·al.lowed in his opinion or appraisal for proximity of the high-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
way next to the property in qUestion.

respond-

·eertainly

ent should be able· to test the credibility of such a ~tll~
or impeach ·hiin ·if he has been ilicorisi.Stent or taken ·a
different position than he is now testifying to before the
jury. Harding had previously testified .that there was
proximity damage because of the condemnation and construction· of the highway and that his total severance damage value of $420.00 was allowed because the back of the
lot was irregular in shape rather than squared (Tr. 178180). He ·also testified that the land and buildings could
be utilized for the same purposes as before the taking Of
the .54 acre pasture; that there was no noise damage from
proximity of the highway because of the location of the
property in an area not the most desirable and that sales
in the area since the construction of the highway were for
their former prices without any depreciation because of
th·e highway. He testified of residential values in the area
of $2,000.00 per acre and comparables in the area at $2,000.00 per acre for the highest and best use to which he coUld
put the property. He also gave sale prices for contiguous
property abutting the highway facility after it was lmown
that the highway was to be built and also after it was in
factcorripleted and that said properties sold (in.his opinion)
for tile same thing that they would have sold for had the
highway· not been put in (which accounted for the ·adjacent prope·rties. to the east and to the south of .the property in question) though the::;buyer was nQt stated except
to say part of one pareel .was taken by the State Qf_.l.]tah

no

· ~-.,·~~

(T:f;, 185-187)..

. ·en
·~ f·

from
,I

--\'·

.: ,.:..··.· .. ·

'c~s~exairii~ati6n·,. :Harding.· admitted .. he <differed
reSIXmdent~'· appr~ise;s> ~fi··severan~ ahd'.'ihat~·:he did
•

~' 1

••

:

!t

iI

"

· . .

l

,

•, •·

,•

• _, .,.__•

.

,..

~

; •

:

.

Ill

~

,
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not get any information from respondents or go through

·their home to make his appraisal (Tr. 188-191). Also he
admitted he didn't know respondents owned additional property and two sheds than he first thought when he made
his appraisal before the condenmation, which appraisal was
unchanged at trial permitting only the $420.00 severance
for iiTegu}ar shape otf the lot; that 1he knew respondents
were in the sheep business :having unknown numbers of
sheep operated on a split operation between home and farm
properties: that the highest and best use of the property
was what it was being used for and rt:lhat there was ·traffic
use out of the south end of the property past the ice plant
to the south; ~that he was not in the sheep business 'but
knew some about sheep but ·no experience with large nwnbers of sheep; that he did not know the number of trucks
that will pass this property when six lanes opened up, but
had an opinion regarding the effect of lights, noise ~d
fumes from diesels on the remaining property (Tr. 191199).
The jury ·had ·been to the property to see how it lay
with respect to the surrounding area. HJarding had testified of the values of the properties to ·the east and to the
south of the subject property and respondents had a right
to inql.lire into 1his knowledge of the disposition of the adjacent property to the west that was similarly situated \Vith
respect to the proximity of and severance by the ~highway,
For testing the credibility of the witness, Harding, who
says there is no proximity damage in this case, cannot respondents examine his reasons and values given for .land
similarly situated of which he had knowledge and experi·
ence, ·but which he pointedl.v omitted from 'his direct tesfi. .
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mony -in·. ·explaining the values· ··of the·· surrounding. p~r
ties,. p~t of ·which were taken for the same h1g~hway pr~j. rot?
.
I

, ' '':·

·.,

-

J

.

•

\

. ,

.. ? ,

,.•

· One· of the -primary issues of this case ·was.. whether
'not there·w~s· proxi~ity .damage to this prope~ caused
by ·oonstruction _of the ~ghway. A~l the ~vidence _up to
the time Mr. Harding Wel$ ~om t9 tell the_tJ;uth was that
there ~as proximity. damage., but Mr. H~~ said,.·there
· wa.S not. Would the r~asons given by Harding to ~xplain
why he prEMously allowed proximity for the property next
door west as ~ed to why he did not ~ a:Dow for the
Property in question be improper? They could certainlY
be explained and differentiated on these ~ide by sid~ a~
praisals and 1Jhis would go to the weight of the _evidence
and not that it was inadmissible or improper. How could
the appellant know what the answers of the witness were
gOing to be ·before he answered? The answer is that appellant must have known the witness was going to discredit
himself or be embarrassed if he answered.
However, the witness did not answer anything- damaging e~cept that he did not ,know: It ·should be ·rioted that
the observation: by Attorney Aldrich was not an objection
. but an observation· ·which the lower court 'nee<f not make
a :hrling upOn. · The· court had previotisly warned Mr. AI.·. ·drich that he· coold ·rule only- on objections ·and inoti<mS,
not ·observations (.Tr. 18-19). -

or'

.

'

The: ~Ount 'stated of $3500.00 in -fu~:._rqu~On was
~uch 1e&s·· ·than· the testimony· Oi ·~ndentS' ·with~ . fur
tli~ ·~Ollrlt Oi· se~erance d~age in· ilie · ihstant ·~e- and
tli~
~d not', be
pr~jo.qicial:'
'as far as the ~jilrY ~~-con. .·
'. ...
. ,.....
.
. ~etl·. · :However,· Counsel for ·~P<>iidents were· uriaJble t0
·,

.

'

.·

.
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.

.-,
-

get any information. froll'l: .. ~- Harding on the question as

ne
~(l ~at:
answer
.
.

and tl;l.e -. trial 'judge sustained the.·._Qbjections to .furt}1er question_s. . ·
.

-

)

in· view of th~ direct· evidence· about value of adjacent

properties, we think that we were entitled to elicit from
Harding whether there W:as proximity damage he allowed
to the west property resulting from the location of the high~
~ay across the south side of both properties. It is everyday practice to ask leading questions of an adverse witness
on cross-examination and to show previous in,consistent or
contradictory opinions of an expert witness.
The court noted himself that no harm had been done
on page 201 orf the transcript where he observed he had sustained appellant's objections and that the witness had not
answered the line of questions objected to. If the damage of this questioning was so prejudicial, why did not
counsel ask for a mistrial or other relief out of the hearing of the jury? No motion for any relief was ever made
by appellant except upon Motion for Remittitur and for
New Trial, after the verdict which the trial j-udge, in his
discretion, denied and .upheld the full jury award whi~ch was
based on the great weight orf the evidence. Obviously, the
trial ju~ge. felt ·there .was ·no :prejudice to appellant here,
. even ·Using hmdsig.ht.
Respondents felt they had a right to inqui~ of this
·adverse ·Witness the full. ba~is for' his
opinion·
there
.
.
.that
.
.was no proxinrlty dainage to this property.. The trial court
did not'illow responde~ts
t~st his ere<tibility
inij)each
him
the respondents have _just eause_t<icomplal~ rather
~

and

'th.an-:ap~riant:

to'

· ·

The court: ~as OO~rect

'nor

·

·

in: ~owing

· -

Harding ·to answer
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if it were not ~~e that the adjacent property owner was
paid a substantial sum a.S damages for proxi.mity of rthis

It would ·have been contrary to and at ·~
with the direct .testimony of ~thds adverse witness that there
was no other severance· damage than the leaving of an irregular back lot line.
highway.

At least the ask·ing of the questions in an attempt to
impeach or test an adverse witness cannot be error or prejudicial. One would be afraid to fight for the truth if the
mere asking the question (even a controversial one) is S'Ufbjeet to recrimination. It was not asked to esta!blish value
or a eomparaJble sale, but to show 1Jhat the witness, Harding, knevv of or himself had allowed substantial proximity
damages for property similarly ·situated The State of Utah
was not even mentioned in the question.
The cases cited ~by appellant under this point do not
deal with cross-examination or where the questions are designed to test credibility or impeach an adverse witn~
Most of the citations deal with cases where counsel ask
questions before a jury when they know it to be improper
or when they are acting in bad faith. Palace Laundry en
v. Royal Indemnity Co., 63 Utah 201, 224 P. 657 says in
a decision by Judge Frick:

"It is next insisted that the judgment should be
reversed for the misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in
propounding a certain question to one of the defendant's witnesses. If judgments were reversed because
opposing counsel propound improper or useless ques·tions to hls adversary's witnesses, few, if any, judgments could be permitted to stand."
1

Held, such contention was without merit.
never been o~ed or modified in Utah.

This case has
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Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. State ex rei Highway Dep't 205
Okla ... 325, 237 P. 2nd 878, 881:
"The burden .is on the appellant to show that the
error was prejudicial. Before such misconduct of counsel can result in a reversal of the judgment, it must
appear that substantial prejudice resulted therefrom
and that the jury were influenced thereby, to the material detriment of the party complaining."
And, if the verdict was otherwise amply supported by competent evidence, there was no substantial error.
The Ritchie case cited by appellant, Weber County v.
Ritchie, 98 U. 272, 96 P. 2nd 744, is not applicable to the
case at bar for the reason that it involved an attempt
to put on direct evidence of a price paid by a condemning
authority but the price stated by the witness in·cluded unsegregated damage amounts in addition to the value of the
land such that it was inappropriate to show the comparable
value of the land alone.
The old rule concerning exclusion of sales to a condemning authority is as stated by appellant's brief. However, the new rationale and holdings of the more recent
cases follow the dissent of Judge Carter. in the California
case cited in ~ ppellant' s brief on pag:e 17 thereof, Cirty of
Los Angeles v. Cole, 28 Cal. 2nd 509, 170 P. 2nd 928, which
case was overruled by County of Los Angeles v._ F~aus, 48
Cal 2nd 672, 312 P. 2nd 680 (1957) and followed· by Co.Vina Hligh ~h~l Dist. of_ L. A. County v. Jobe, 174 Cal.
2nd ·340 345 P. 2nd 78 (.1959) .. .'l'he ~aus case stands for
~
•~
the propositl.:on tpat in a condemnation proceeding,. eviden~ -~f priCes
for sitjlilar · projierty
·th~;: VicinitY,
including prices Paid by cond~ei•; was adihissibl~ oh. di'

•

Pitid

"•·"' ·::..

•

'

•,· ;

•. •

\

'

'

•

•

·,

> :•

IJ ...

in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
rect examination and cross-examination.of witness who was
presenting testimony on issue of value of condemnee's property. The decision also states that in· overruling a line of
contrary decisions that the former rule is no longer the rna~
jority rule and was contrary to logic, unrealistic and obsolete. However, the sale must be genuine, and the price
must be actually paid or substantially secured.
These recent cases follow the rationale of the Curley
v. Mayor of Jersey City case, 83 NJL 760, 85 A. 197, 43
LRA, NS 985, "in the absence of extraordinary' circumstan,ces, we are unable to see, as a general rule, why private
sales to parties having the right to eondenm do not come
quite as near representing in their results. true market value
as do such sales made between parties neither of whom
have this power." Most sales involve parties who are under
pressure of one kind or another to either buy or sell for
their own particular reasons. The fact of a sale being to
a condemning authority is a "matter going to the weight
or value of the evidence, not its admissibility." See Institute on Eminent Domain, 1961, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas, Pages 99-103, 110-111, which sets
out the foregoing new legal development and also recites
that cross-examination of an expert witness almost never
is grounds for reversing a judgment from a lower cotut.

The rule has always been that even where the rule
prevails that comparable sales are not admissible on direct
examination, that evidence of such sales may be brought
out on cross-examination for the purpose of discrediting
a Witness. State v. Peek, supra. Thus, cross-examination
of condemnor's witnesses on what they had valued other
lands was prope·r for the purpose of testing the accuracy
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valu~ti~

'

~t

and honesty of their
of the land in their
exaniliiation, City of San Luis: Obispo v. Brizzola~a 1 . 100
Cal. 434, 34-.P. 1083. Also, how much condemnor ha~. -paid
for other lands _was not admissible as· evidence in chief, but
only by vvay of cross-examination for the purpose of testing the fairness or honesty of the opinion of the witness
given upon his direct examination, Waterworks v. Drinkhouse, 92 Oil. 532, 28 P. 681.
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe RR Co. v. Southern
Pacific RR Co., (1936) Cal. 57 P 2nd 575, held evidence of
prices paid for other lands than those soughrt to be condemned was :prope·r on cross-examination of p].ajntiff's witnesses in eminent domain proceedings. Palladine v. Imperial Valley Fann Lands Ass'n, 65 cal. App. 727, 225 P
291, 303, ·held ·cross-e}{)amination on value of other lands
is proper to test credibility and to impeach opffiions of witnesses, but not for fixing the value of the land. In People
v. Vinson, 99 Cal. 2nd 100, 221 P. 2nd 161, cross-examination of expert witness was allowed to test his knowledge,
and to test the weights to be given to hds opinion and to
impeach his opinion as to values stated by inquiring the
prices whieh are asked or have been paid for other similar
lands.

The Covina High School District v. Jobe case, supra,
held that the asking and answering of leading questions on
cross-examination of expert witnesses regarding price paid
by another school district in settlement pending condemnation litigation was not reversible error; that in condemnation proceedings wide latitude sh~d be allowed on crossexrulunation of e~rt witnesses .t~. t~t their reasons and
valldity ~f ~their opinions as to value; that c~exarnina-
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t~o~, and by le~g questions, ~ school district's expert
'vitnes3es on specific prices, values ·and am.OUlllts paid for
ot:her parcels \vas permitted for
limited pmpose at test~
ing witnesseS and was not evidence of Inarket value. Th~
case also recites, ''Had the plaintiff 'been of the opinion that
the asking of the question on cross-examination constituted
error, it might have been well for ilt to have lnade a motion
for a new trial which it did not do. We think there was
no ·abuse of discretion.''

the

Our Utah Court has held iri ·Southern
Pacific
Co. .v.
.
A·rthur, 10 Utah 2nd 306, 352 P. 2nd 693, t~t prices paid
for similar property is admissible to shOW" value of property taken in condemnation proceedings, and as showini
.
source of knowledge upon which opinion evidence is based.
In Weber Basin Water ConservancY District v. Ward, 10
Utah 2nd 29, 347 P. 2nd ~~,·this court held the purpose
of cross-examination was to test crediJbility and whatever
may tend to explain, modify or contradict the direct evidence; and that though trial judge has discretion to control cross-examination, he should not prevent inquiry into
matters having direct bearing upon the vital issues of the
case.
In the case at bar, an attempt was being made to test
the credibility of and impeach the opinion of appellant's

expert witness Harding who said there was no proximity
damage resulting from the construction of this highway.
Respondents' witnesses had already established by their
testimony their estimate of the market value, proximity
damage and severance damage involved. Appellant wants
a new trial now for even suggesting a conflict in the knowledge or opinion of its expert witness on the groWl$ that
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the QUestion alone ·. was misoonduct, bad· f.aith, prejudicial

and embarrassing t<? appellant and said expert. Appellant
and·, Mr. Harding sh?uld be embarrassed. i:r;t saying there
was no proximity damage or substantial severance in this
case. These damage values of proximity and severance
of the property were the main issue of the case and it
certainly cannot be error to attempt to cross-examine an
adverse expert on this question and ms previous testimony.
POINT III

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO· RECEIVE EVIDENCE ON BEHALF OF THE STATE O·F
UTAH, APPELLANT, RELATIN·G TO ZONING RESTRICTIONS ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Counsel for appellant is incorrect in starting that the
lower ~court refused evidence on zoning restrictions of the
subject property. It is not pointed out where in the transcript that testimony was refused on pertinent ~oning regulations. As set out in respondents' brief under Additional
Statement of Facts, we ·have set fioctJh with transcript references that all the witnesses of both appellant and respondents, consistently testified that at the time set for
compensation, January 20, 1960, the condemned property
\Vas zoned residential-agricultural which allowed for k~
ing sheep and that this was the highest and best . use · ~
the property. Appellant's expert witnesses, Hwding ~~
Stein, were specifically allowed by the court to .testify t~at
the Christensen property could .l>e used for chicken ~aisi_rlg
at the ijroe Said premises we~ -~qemn~ ('fr. 1.~~,'.2~())~·;
and al~ that after said condepm.ation, the zoriffi.g O,rdirlan~
ces were changed (Tr. 175, 222)·~ Apparently appell~.t i~
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complaining that the lower court did refuse to allow_ said
Harding and· Stein to testify that under the neW zondng or~
dinance continued sheep usage "was at best non-conform' .
'
.
ifrig" (Appellant's Brief, P. 25; but compare _with "opj~7
tives" Tr. 176) .·
The trial of this case was had in March, 1961, approximately rthree months after appellant's witness, ·Stein, said
the new zoning ordinance went into effect (Tr. 222) and
about fifteen months after the property ·had been acquired
by appellant under eminent domain. Respondent, Marion
Christensen, correctly testified, without objection from appellant, and also under cross-examination, that the nonusage of the property for chickens for two years prior to
the time of trial made it impossible to raise chickens now
imder the new ordinan,ce (Tr. 27, 45-46). Whether or not
the new ordinance made sheep usage on said property "noneonforming" was immaterial on the question of darilages
and the tri~al ·court was quite correct in refusing to alloW
appellant's witnesses to state in what way the zOning Ordinances have been changed or modified since the date set
for fixing the amount of compensation (Tr. 175-176, 221222) . Besides,· Stein testified ·-.that he didn't even take into
consideration the zoning ordinance ohange in his appraisal
(Tr. 222) and Harding testified in his opinion- the praperty
could be utilized for the same purpose after· the construction of the highway as· it was utilized for before said condemnation (Tr. 179).

In other words, the _evidence is uncontroverted that
the· ·~~demned premiseS. Could be used for· ni.ismg sheep
or 'chickens at .the tiine of 'said condemnation. There simply is no issue_ regarding the zoning status of the property
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allOwed full ~osure of. the :und~ding
of rthe witnesses regarding effects of zo.rrlng regUr~tioos on
the m·arket value of ~the property as of Ja.111UarY 20, 1960,
the time of the taking herein, ~d the only time which is
pertinent ·to the affixing of damage values.

arnd the'.OO\irt

·Apparently the only purpose of appellant in raising
the point at all during the trial was an attempt to eonfuse
the jtl!ry on 'the meaning of the term "non-conforming"
with regard to eonrtinuing usage of the premises for sheep
(Tr. 45-46, 73, 83, 111, 134) whereby on cross-examination (and in argument to the jury) appellant mised the
question of sheep usage now as being "non-conforming"
and if discontinued it ·could not be resumed.
Or, perhaJps appellant designed for the respondents to
take the ,money they coWd not obtam for rtlheir damages
and rush out to buy several thousand chickens to put m
their sheep shed buildings before the new restrictive zoning
ordinance came into effect. Tile operation of 1Jhe respondents w:as for raising sheep since 1947 and if the value of
the improvements is destrowed for such usage, appellant
cannot fo~ce :respondents to undertake a hazardous chicken
operation merely to utilize existing facilities. However,
the court allO\\fed appellant ·to put in this evidence allowing
chicken usage by both its witnesses, Harding and Stein.
How can appellant compladn on lack of evidence concerning zoning? Sheep usage is admittedly permitted under
the conditions existing Januacy 20, 1960, for residentialagricultural zone or continuing thereaf,ter under a chang~
zone. The evidence on zoning was important only to show
.what the expert appraisers for both litigants took into
·consideration in evaluating the· damages compensable and
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~~ '~, ~~ ~~t ~~to~ ·the ~gnt; ~
be ·given the ~ions by _t~e. jury.

POINT IV-

-·- -·

-_

..

_:

-~·
..

JURY INSTRUCTlON NO._ 7 OF THE FO~TH DISTRier COUR~ WAS- NOT. AN INCORR.ECr _STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND l)ID NOT- CONSTITUTE
PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
.

~his la$ point

.

..

raised by appellant seems to be an af.ter-

th()U.ght Qf counsel to find error in_ the ~record for the pur·pose of this appeal. Th~ issue_ concerning the alleged pre. judicial error of Instruction No. .7 was not even mentioned

by appeHant for- grounds for relief in its Motion ·tor Re-.
mittitur or its Motion.for New Trial (R. 76-79) nor in its
Notice
of Appeal setting . forth
the ''matters and points. of
- .
error'' (R. 87 -88). We. th~ .i.t- should be ~arded
on
.
thJs·-gl-ound alone._
.

~

However, the
objection
to this. instruction
by State's
- .
.
A~mey Aldrich (R. 282) _specifically o~jects to the second paragraph rtJhereof relating to damages to respondents'
_sheep opera~on. An~ ~er _objection _to ~ instruction
is general and. is theref-ore n~~ en~tled _. ~o- consi?eration
Di~ck_ v. U~ Fu~l Co., ~9 U. 430~ ~64 P. -~7,2,. holds that
where an ex~on ls ~en to ~y a po~on of ~ in-.

.

struction, the ~ on appeal .cannot consider compl~
~ other portions th~. An ~bjecmoo to an instruction
which ~tes it is contrary to :the law and evidence of the
case does not comply wirth the requirements ·of. R~e 51 of

Rules of Ci~il Procedure~ ~d since the· p~ of
the ·rule is to bring ._to the attention. of the court specifiC
errors to give_ an opportunity _to correct the ~e, rthe ob-

uiah
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jection should be specifiic enough to give the trial court
notice of every error in the instruction, which is complained
of on appeal. Employers' Mutual Liability Insurance Company v. Allen Oil Co., 123 U. 253, 258 P. 2nd 445, 450.
Under these eases, objections for the first time in appellant's appeal brief are not well taken as to rthe second
sentence of -said instruction involving cutting off access to
a highway, vibrations, dust or obstructing of view.
The theory of the appellant in this case, again, was
that there was no interference with respondents' sheep operation by the taking by the State of Utah of the pasture
ground for a highway and leaving the buildings in an nndamaged condition. This instruction properly sets out the
issue giving both theories of damage, namely, what are
the. elements to be ~considered in fixing the damages, if any,
to the remaining land of the defendant. These damages
may include such items as the cutting of remaining land
into irregular or ~inconvenient shapes such as was testified
to by State's witnesses Harding and Stein. Or it may include ·cutting off access to a road (enjoyed by respondents
with their sheep at the rear of the premises for 25 years)
or noise, dust and attendant damages of the thruway testified to by respondents and the expert wimesses. Or it
may includ~ as an element the use of the property for
sheep operations as set forth by all the witnesses (if the
usage of the remainder thereof was impaired by the taking).

The cases cited by appellant's brief"oil page '27 there-of stand fo:rl··the proposition that an instruction whicn .
'
.
._, .--:'
: . .
·.
plffins the evidentiary value of some· facts to the· exclusion
of oth~rs· 'funst1totes commentirtg ·():ri~·the evidence: b~{-·fue
.

.

. ...

.

.

.

'

..

_

.

.

.

ex-

.

.

.
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court. Yet Instruction No. 7 is then complained· of .l10t
that it cXeCludes any facts, but that it includ~ too- mu~h·~
It should be remembered that appellant's theory of the
damageS Was that there \Vas DO ·_damage to the remaj.nder
property from rthe items mentioned in the instruction except for the first items set forth therein of cutting the land
into irreguiar (Harding) or inconvenient (Stein) shapes.
The instruction further provides in two places that the
damage to the remaining land may be none by using the
term .''if_ any'' in connection with the fixing of damages.
Counsel is incorrect in. stating on P. 28 of appellant's
brief that the construction of the public improvement did
not limit or. restrict any access to the defendant's property,
~vhi~h they· enjoyed prior to the taking. Respondents testified of the access they enjoyed, as did appellant's own
witness, ·Harding, who had been in the real estate business
in American· Fork for 16 years, that respondents have ta~en their sheep to their farm on the road south of the condemned property for as long as he could remember (Tr.
21-26, 158~159, 166, 197). Respondents' testimony also reveals they eoilld not drive their sheep to their home property now at all with the freeway built as it is and the city
restrictions preventing such use of city streets north of
the,. freeway.
.
.'

/

~

C9un.se1 for appellant also errs in claiming damages
~ere all~wed. by Instruction No. 7 for a business, loss of
profits. or prospective damages to a business concern. The

instruetion is clear that the items to be considered for damif. 'any, Was th~ Us~· Of the land as
unit for sheep
ffiising ·purposes and the lessened value of the reptainder
as· a .site for the pwposes for which the land was being

agffi,

a
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ot. damages to· profits o~. inc~~~ ;:~~s
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received by· the court. An analysis of the value8_, on. dam. :
..
'
·,;
'
ages (relating to the sheep operation) reVeals . tha~. the
amountS were obtained by the respondents' e~rt witneSses priricipally 'DY depreciating the ·Costs ·C1f · the lambing
sheds and granary,. ;as totally useless for continued sheep
operations and non-salvagable (See appr8.isal summary ref·
erences in Additional Statement of Facts, supra) . Respondents and their expert witnesses testified the property and
buildings could no longer be used for sheep operations after
the ·taking and appellant's ~witness Harding said it couldthat was the issue.
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State v. Noble, 6 U. 2nd 40, 305 P. 2nd 495, cited by
appellant, deals with loss of future profits from sale Of sand
and gravel deposits on land condemned and ~has no bearing on this case question of severance damages to rthe

re-

m.affiing tract.

"The owner is not limited to recovery of the value of
only that part of the tract which was physically appropriated. The entire tract is considered as a whole and the
effect of the condemnation and the projected use evaluated
so thaJt determination can be :made of what he had prior
to the proceeding and what he had lef1t thereafter." NiChols on Eminent Domain, Volume 4, P. 298, Sec. 14.1 (2).
"Just compensation guaranteed by the constitution implies
not merely the value of so much land separately from its
connection wirth the whole tract, ·burt the injucy or loss to
the whole estate caused by taking from it the part which
i$ so appropriated." Ibid, P. 312, Sec. 14.21. See also
-Pages 328 to 337, SeC. _14.231, 14.23.2 and 14.24. · ·"The size
and ·shape in which the relnainder· of the pareel is left is
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sometimes _such that the land cannot be put to its ·most
advantageous ·Use~ ··It is generally a~ that it may ~~
shoW:n to what· uses the prOperty might have been ~t prior
to ·the> tillting ·and the Iuhited ,uSe. t~ ~hich tlhe remaiitder
he deVoted subsequently as a . resUit of such taking.
EVidence ·is admissible tnat the remainder area is no longer
capable of use for a particular pu.rpose or that its facility
therefor has been impaired." Ibid, Pages 352-354, Sec.
14.243. "Such depreciation may result also from fu.e manner in which the severance is effected, or from the fact
that necessary or· desiiabl~ ·facilities are thffi.eby. rend~
inacCessible or difficUlt of convenient access.'' Ibid, Pages
356-358, Sec. 14.243.
•

may

~

'

'

t ..

AnYWay, an exception exists to the general rule against

shqwing
p:r_ufits from .use of landJ when the income or p.ro.
fits represent ..th~. proceec}s fro111: the sale of livestock ~
for and fed on the land in question, because the· i.n(xmle.is
deriv~ from _the use of t1}1.e land and not as profits from a
business ~d~ed thereon, ~ty Wld County. of Denv~
vs.. Qu~ck, 113 P. 2nd 999, 134 ALR. 1120.
'

.

•

I

,

'

.:

•

Any alleged improper words· in the instruction reklting to obstruction of view, odors or vibrations, etc.· were
certainly not prejudicial because these points were not
~stressed by either party (though there was some evidence
on it) and were· not considered of much consequence. on
the issue of damages. This wording on damages was -largely incorporated frOm Am. Jur., Proof of Facts, VoL 4, Pages
452-453.

Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Prooodure, required thart
if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the
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the

exclusive judges of all questions of
fact. This the lower \!ourt did in Instruction No. 13 (Tr.
27~) and such instruction would remove any pre,judice that
allegetny might flow from Instruction No. 7.
jury that they are

CONCLUSION

The dramatic language in ~ppellant's brief characterizing the evidence and the "holocaust" of errors simply
does not compare with the truth, if the transcript of the
case is studied to see what really occurred during the trial.
The evidence presented. by appellant was l.argely negative,
but the jury verdict was based on the positive evidence of
damages presented by respondents. Appellant ~has failed
to show any prejudice or that the verdict was nort sustained
by the evidence. As a matter of law, the trial court ·has
sustained the verdict of the jury and the judgment.
Respondents are elderly people deprived of their property without recompense for nearly two years by appellant. It would be manifestly unfair for them to have to
submit to the expense and stress orf a new trial, now requested by appellant, except for the most gross injustice
to appellant resulting from the trial. Appellant never asked
for relief from any such assumed gross injustice warranti~g a mistrial or new jury panel. Most of the matter& here
on appeal by appellant are routine and frivolous in the hop~
that a second trial would prove more favorable to the .condemning authority.
A ~paratively small . ~?illlt of
money is involved and respondents are in danger of peing
litigated to ruin. Appellant has the land .apd ~s~dents'
money· th~r~fo~·, ·so that respo~cknts ·are un~bl~
·~pl~~
··j·:L·
what has.been taken.
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The jury verdict and judgment of the trial court below should be affirmed in the interest of substantial justice.
Respectfully submitted,
MORGAN AND PAYNE

Attorneys for Respondents,
Marion H. Christensen and
Rintha G. Christensen, his wife
128 East Center tSreet

Provo, Utah
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